

# CO-OPTING BY MAKING POLICY CONCESSIONS: ANALYZING LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN AN AUTHORITARIAN CONGRESS\*

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## Abstract

What role do legislative activities play in the authoritarian regimes? In this study, I develop the policy co-optation explanation, in that legislative bureaucracies incorporate delegates' demands into law making. By using a unique database on the legislation of the 2008-2012 China's National People's Congress ("NPC"), I find that the number of delegates submitting motions in favor of a bill significantly increased the probability of the bill being positively responded by the Special Committee of NPC. A set of quantitative robustness checks and a detailed case study of China's Crime Act confirm the baseline results. Additionally, I demonstrate that legislative bureaucracies are more responsive to the bills mentioned by political outsiders' motions, with special regards to those from relevant professions (lawyer, researchers, journalist, and engineers). They also make nice to the policy issues with a higher preference congruence among the demography-based delegations. Besides its impact on the legislative review, the number of delegates' motions

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appears to have an impact on the following years' annual legislative plan and further prolongs the bill reading process. Together, evidence in this paper sheds more light on the functioning of policy concession in a non-democratic regime and thus contributes to a better understanding of law-making activities in authoritarian legislatures.

**Keywords:** Authoritarian Regime; Policy Concessions; China; National People's Congress

## 1 Introduction

Debating and passing laws is one of the parliament's main roles. Volume of scholarship has demonstrated how representative institutions affect policymaking in democratic regimes. ([Austen-Smith and Banks 1988](#); [Arnold 1992](#); [Fenno 1977](#)) In addition, scholars in recent decades have started to pay attention to the authoritarian congress that had previously been known as a mere "democratic decoration". As many of them argue, the authoritarian congress is not simply a club of "yes-men". Conversely, it appears to play a crucial role in determining the longevity of authoritarian regimes. ([Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, 2007](#); [Lust-Okar 2006](#); [Wright 2008](#); [Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009](#); [Escribà-Folch 2012](#); [Reuter and Robertson 2015](#))

The existing literature on authoritarian politics depicts three facets of congress in these regimes. First, power-sharing theorists elucidate that parliament is an ideal venue for autocrats to co-opt ruling elites, who would otherwise have the capacity to dislodge dictators from the catbird seat. ([Svolik 2012](#); [Boix and Svolik 2013](#)) In addition to facing threats from inner-circle elites, autocrats also need to thwart the challenge from political outsiders, including both the elite and the masses. ([Gandhi and Przeworski 2006](#)) To buy the masses' support, authoritarian leaders introduce elections to identify the citizens' preferences and then incorporate them into policymaking in order to reduce the risk of uprising. ([Lust-Okar 2006](#); [Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009](#); [Jensen, Malesky and Weymouth 2014](#)) Moreover, as scholars working within the framework of co-optation theory argue, autocrats sometimes choose to mobilize cooperation with their opposing elites by distributing specific rents or general policy concessions in the parliament. Regarding the allocation of the specific rents, existing scholarship provides a detailed

empirical confirmation on how dictators use the parliament to distribute the rents, perks and spoils to the delegates and how this personal co-optation reduces the protests. (Desposato 2001; Malesky and Schuler 2010; Truex 2014b; Reuter and Robertson 2015). However, owing to the data limitation that the autocratic government scarcely release valuable information pertaining to their decision making process, only a few scholarships provide empirical evidence on the general relationship between policy co-optation and economic growth. (Wright 2008) However, the mechanism of legislative co-optation remains blur. Until now, little systematic evidence has been put forward to illuminate how the process of policy concession works between autocrats and delegates.

To make a better understanding the autocratic policy concession mechanism, I set out in this paper to investigate how legislative bureaucracies incorporate delegates' demands into the national policymaking by using a data set with variables including the delegates' background, their legislative activities, and the legislative outcomes in China's National People's Congress ("NPC").

The NPC provides a quintessential context for the exploration of the legislative activities in non-democratic regimes. In particular, the NPC legislative motion system provides us affluent information to investigate delegates' policy preference and autocrats' decisions on that. As a distinctive feature of authoritarian rule, NPC delegates cannot directly affect lawmaking, lacking the power to veto the pre-set bills. (O'Brien 1988, 2008; Potter 1999) and legislative bureaucracies in the special committee ("SPC") and the standing committee ("STC") monopolize the power of lawmaking. However, China's national legislation is not dictated exclusively by members of these two powerful committees. In the current system, NPC delegates are allowed to initiate legislative motions ("li fa an"), as a channel to affect the lawmaking process controlled by these bureaucracy-driven committees. Through a legislative motion review system, delegates can express their opinions on a variety of policy issues to the Communist leaders in China. On the other sides, the political leaders seems to show benevolence to delegates' motions. In 2005, the NPC launched a reform to ameliorate its bureaucratic system's responsive function. One consequence of that reform is that the SPC now has to accept every delegate's motion without selection and respond by means of an annual, act-based motion review report,

indicating whether delegates' demands have been incorporated in an aggregate form.

In this paper, I make three arguments through analyzing the legislative motion review system in Chinese national parliament: First, the bureaucratic-driven committees make more positive response to the policy issues that address by a greater number of motions. Second, legislative bureaucracies are more responsive to the bills mentioned by political outsiders' motions, with special regards to those from relevant professions (lawyer, researchers, journalist, and engineers). Third, they also make nice to the policy issues with a higher preference congruence among the demography-based delegations.

Overall, my findings mainly contribute to three lines of literature. First, this paper complements authoritarian policy concession by demonstrating the impact of delegates' demands on a variety of legislative outcomes. Besides the positive impact on bureaucracies' attitudes towards the motions, delegates' legislative activities can further influence the legislative agenda setting and prolong the procedure of bill reading in order to foster a more deliberative policy making process.

Evidence in this paper also helps scholars to understand the authoritarian responsiveness. Under the authoritarian setting, political leaders improve governance by making response to citizens' preferences through online social networking sites and several similar means such as the letter petition system and the mayor's mailbox. (Chen, Pan and Xu 2014; Distelhorst and Hou 2014; Li 2014) local legislatures also become more "representative" by being able to response people's public goods demands in each electoral district. (Manion 2014) In the national parliament, legislative bureaucracies respond to grass-root opinion via an innovative online participation portal, letting citizens engage into the debate over social and economic policies. (Truex 2014a) Adding to the relevant literature, this paper puts forward a direct mechanism for legislative responsiveness: policymakers may attempt to tap the details of delegates' policy preferences by incorporating into the process delegates' legislative motions, which are highly related to their occupations.

Besides contributing to developing the theories of authoritarian politics, my study aims to speak to the legislative coalitions scholarship which has so far been mainly restricted to democratic countries. (Schofield 1982) In advanced democracies, policy coalitions is formed

by the compromise of parties and governments. Inspired by the congressional coalition studies applied in European countries, I use the bill act-based quantitative analysis developed by [Martin and Vanberg \(2004\)](#); [Martin \(2011\)](#); [Martin and Vanberg \(2014\)](#), the conclusion of which suggests that authoritarian legislators emphasize the coalition behavior among delegates representing different demographics.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The second section describes the institutional background of NPC and its legislative procedure. The third section then goes on to provide the data source. In the fourth section, I present my identification strategy and the baseline result of motions' impact on the SPC's response. I establish the robustness of my findings through several checks in the sixth section. Finally, I present my conclusions in the fifth section.

## 2 Background of NPC Legislation

### 2.1 Divisions in NPC

It is a commonly held opinion that NPC delegates only give their approval for pre-determined decisions. Every year, NPC would hold annual plenary ("APNPC"): circa 3000 delegates from 35 delegations convene for their yearly joint session in Beijing for no more than two weeks to listen to government reports, submit their legislative motions, and vote on bills. Due to its sheer size and limited meeting time, APNPC merely votes on a few so-called "substantial" bills - such as the Constitutional Amendments, the Property Right Act, or the Crime Act - which have already been passed by the STC in advance. None of these bills have ever been rejected by NPC delegates since the institution's establishment.

Analogous to the committees in the US Congress, the standing committee and special committee of the NPC exert a crucial impact on shaping the national policies of China. These committees are the bureaucratic apparatus of NPC, composed of former senior officials in both the civilian and the military branch. In contrast to the APNPC, the STC is a small quota, full-time legislative institution empowered as a *de facto* legislative apparatus since the mid-1990s, when it was under the leadership of Wan Li, one of the founders of the Communist

Party of China (“CPC”). Due to his strong ties to several dominant figures in the CPC, the STC became the CPC’s agent in NPC and obtained the discretion over setting the five-year legislative agenda (“wu nian li fa gui hua”) and annual legislative plans (“nian du li fa ji hua”), as well as the power to read and vote on bills. Figure 1 explicitly illustrates the unbalanced legislation role in terms of the bills passed by the APNPC and the STC respectively. From 1982 to 2012, the STC approved nearly 82 percent of the national acts while APNPC determined the remaining 18 percent.

[Figure 1 about here.]

Another important branch of the Chinese legislative bureaucracy is the SPC. The NPC establishes seven subcommittees: the Ethnic Affairs Committee, Law Committee, Committee for Internal and Judicial Affairs, Financial and Economic Committee, Education, Science, Culture and Health Committee, Foreign Affairs Committee, Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, Environment and Resources Protection Committee and Agriculture and Rural Affairs Committee. These committees are responsible for reviewing delegates’ motions, drafting bills, and coordinating and advising the STC. At present, the committee members of the SPC are relatively professionalized. Besides some retired senior communist officials, the rest members of these committees come from the nation’s most prestigious law schools, as well as leading research institutes affiliated with various industries and government ministries. For example, in the 11th NPC session, 165 out of 282 members (58.51%) were former senior officials, 42 had served in the management layer of the PLA. The rest were intellectuals, mostly professionals and retired SOE managers. Anecdotally, albeit occupying over 400 hundred seats in APNPC, only one private entrepreneur - Li Denghai, the CEO of an agricultural corporation in Shandong - worked in the agricultural committee of the SPC.

## 2.2 Delegates of the 11th NPC

On February 28, 2008, the official media channel of NPC released the list of the 2981 delegates of the 11th NPC, the largest congress in the world. Table 1 displays the basic personal

information of these delegates, including their age, gender, education years, party membership and so forth.

[Table 1 about here.]

There are two ways candidates may be “elected” to serve as a delegate in China’s national assembly. The majority of delegates are “elected” by the provincial-level people’s congress according to the principle of proportionate representation. The STC allocates the rest of the available seats to their members, members of SPC, the senior officials in the central government, and the CPC central committee. Similar to the delegates elected by the provincial people’s congress, central-nominated delegates are also allocated to 35 delegations during the yearly session, including 31 provincial units in Mainland, Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan and PLA. The population mainly determines the quota of each delegation except for the PLA. Figure 2 shows the delegate distribution among 35 NPC delegations.

[Figure 2 about here.]

In terms of the distribution of party membership, there is no doubt that the CPC is the legislative majority, accounting for 74.1% (2,260) of the seats in the Chinese National Parliament. The remaining 26.1% of NPC delegates represent seven satellite parties or have no clear party affiliation (the latter accounting for 13.18% of the parliamentary seats)(See details in Appendix A1). Regarding the committee affiliation, the SPC members and the STC members occupy 9.25% and 6.33% of the seats respectively, while other delegates with no special affiliation are in clear majority (89.2%). As a result of electoral manipulations, regular citizens have a low probability of obtaining a seat in the Chinese National Parliament, not to mention the vanishingly small chance of the political opponents of the dominant party. Appendix A2 shows the occupational distribution of all 3049 delegates by using both the official occupational index as well as [Malesky and Schuler \(2010\)](#)’s coding rule on the occupational distribution in Vietnam’s National Assembly, a Communist-dominated congress similar to NPC. Over 90% of the delegates turn out to be government officials, SOEs’ managers, professionals (lawyers, engineers, scientists and university faculty members), and wealthy private entrepreneurs. Moreover,

as evidenced by their average degree of education achieved especially considering it takes on average 17.38 years to obtain a Master's degree in China's educational system.

### **2.3 The Legislative Process of NPC**

In order to understand how legislation works in China, I first elaborate briefly on the legislative process of NPC (Figure 3). In the Chinese parliamentary procedure, four steps pave the way for a draft to become an approved act. First, seven institutions (STC, SPC, State Council, the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate and the Central Military Committee) have the chance to draft a bill to the STC. In the first year of every session, the STC decides which drafts will be listed on its Five-year Legislative Agenda. This is a crucial step in the process of agenda-setting as exemplified by the fact that nearly 70% of the bills approved in the 11th NPC session were listed in the 11th Five-year Legislative Plan. Within every session, the STC circulates legislative plan annually to calibrate the legislative agenda. Once the bills are placed on the annual agenda, the STC and the SPC then proceed to read these bills one to five times, discussing whether some articles should be revised. After the revising process, the bill is submitted to the STC or the APNPC for a vote, while the final voting largely remains a mere formality.

[Figure 3 about here.]

In spite of having no voice in the above described lawmaking process, NPC delegates have a way of expressing their opinion in an attempt to affect policymaking through the initiation of legislative motions. After collecting delegates' motions at the end of the yearly plenary, the SPC reviews these motions with the STC, the State Council, and other related ministries in the following six months. In the end, the committee releases a bill/act-based review on every motion, indicating whether their content has been consolidated in the new version of the bill or the future STC legislative plan.

During the 11th NPC session, delegates initiated 2488 legislative motions of making new laws or changing existing ones. Despite the overall moderate and polite tone of the SPC's reply (signalling to delegates that the committee would conduct research on their motion),



the institution constructed an articulate response only to a handful of motions, mostly stating that the STC had already incorporated their opinions, or would list the bills referred to in their motions on the next legislative plan. Here I present an example of a motion review of the Financial and Economic Committee, which suggests that the STC would incorporate their opinion into the next session's legislative agenda.

*“ Xu Jinglong and other 31 delegates, Ren Yuqi and other 30 delegates, Zhou Xiaoguang and other 30 representatives, Tang Hongjun and other 31 delegates, Huang He and other 30 delegates, Jiang Hongkun and other 32 delegates proposed a motion to revise the Food Safety Act 6 (Article 9, 29, No. 35,134,147,307). The motions suggest that food safety plays a crucial role in the social stability. Guaranteed food security is conducive to the maintenance of national security and the protection of the healthy development of the national economy. The Food Safety Act has been included in the 10th STC legislative plan. Currently, the National Development and Reform Commission, Food Bureau is studying the preparation of a draft on the issues of grain circulation, health and safety, emergency response, and food industry management. Our committee will incorporate the comments made by the delegates’ of motions as well as accelerate the SPC’s bill reading process.*

This motion review report reveals that in 2008, there were six motions with 184 joint-signatures<sup>1</sup> focusing on modifying the Food Safety Act. Instead of representing some bureaucratic *cliche*, this review signals a clear statement that the SPC aims to ingratiate the delegates by incorporating their demands. To examine the relationship between the number of motions and the legislature's responsive attitude, I am going to test the effect of delegates' motions on the SPC's responsiveness as well as the legislative outcome in an attempt to gain a deep insight into the functioning of legislature in China.

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<sup>1</sup>Joint-signatures: 31+30+30+31+30+32=184

## 3 Data

In this paper, I use the legislative process in 11th NPC session (2008-2012) to investigate the role of delegates' short proposals in the Chinese national parliament. I constructed the Chinese National Legislative Dataset by combining as many as four data sources: 1) the motion review report released by SPC during 11th NPC session, which derived from the NPC Yearbook("Quan Guo Ren Da Nian Jian) 2) the NPC legislative records gleaned from Chinese Legislative Statistics("Zhong Guo Li Fa Tong Ji) 3) the list of legislative motions from the Bulletin of the STC 4) the Biographic Information of 11th NPC delegates.

### 3.1 Responsive Attitude

Table 3 presents summary statistics. The dependent variable of the baseline model is the SPC's responsive attitude towards delegates' motions. Since the SPC did not make a specific response to each motion but released an aggregate evaluation on a bill mentioned by several delegates' motions. Therefore, the variation of the SPC's responsive attitude occurs on the act-year level.

[Table 2 about here.]

To gauge SPC's responsive attitude, I grabbed 1403 pieces of SPC's motion review reports during 2008-2012 and coded these files by using a simple text analysis. Table 4(Appendix Table A3) presents the detailed coding rule, in which I used the narrowest definition of "a positive response: I coded the review as a positive one only if it contains two types of statement, in which the SPC articulate that the bill had been 1) incorporated in this year's legislation 2) incorporate in the future legislative plan. While all the rest are coded as the negative. Over the 11th NPC session, around 15% the bills that proposed by delegates received a positive response from the SPC.

## 3.2 Delegates' Motions

My key explanatory variable is delegates' legislative emphasis measured by the number of motions on each bill. I collected legislative motions (“li fa an”) initiated by 11th NPC delegates from the Bulletin of STC (Quan Guo Ren Da Chang Wei Hui Gong Bao”, 2008-2012). The bulletin includes the name, main initiator and the number of joint signature of each motion. During the 11th NPC, 598 of 3048 NPC delegates initiated legislative motion on either enacting a new act or revising an existing act.

## 3.3 Legislative Information

I use the Statistical Book of Chinese Legislation (“Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Li Fa Tong Ji 2013”) to glean the legislative information. Before the first plenary meeting of 11th NPC session, 229 acts have been enacted by either APNPC or STC. The book contains precise legislative records since 1949, including its latest revision, the drafters' name, the times of revision, the frequency of revision and the category of the act. To further reduce heterogeneity problem, I collected the number of article and chapters of each act derived from the Chinese Law and Regulation Database (“Zhong Guo Fa Lv Fa Gui Shu Ju Ku).

## 3.4 Biographic Information of NPC delegates

As an approach to investigating whose motion has the largest marginal effect on the SPC's responsive attitude, I merged the legislative motion with their initiators' personal characteristics, which was derived from the official website of the NPC (Zhong Guo Ren Da Wang) and Baidu Encyclopedia.(“Bai Du Bai Ke) The official website provides a brief curriculum vitae of 3049 11th NPC delegates, including their name, gender, birthplace, occupation, membership in NPC, party membership, education and so forth . To fill the omitted information, I used Baidu Encyclopedia, a Chinese Wikipedia, as the supplementary sources.

## 4 Empirical Strategy and Main Results

I examined the effect of NPC delegates' motions on the STC's responsive attitude by using a probit model. The observations are 1403 pieces of SPC motion reviews reports on 599 bills for new laws and 153 bills for changing an existing law. The dependent variable *Response* is a binary indicator of whether the response attitude of SPC motion reviews is positive. I code them "1" as the positive response. In contrast, all other types of negative or ambiguous response would be classified as "0".

$$P(\text{Response}_{it}) = \Phi(\beta \text{Motion}_{it} + \delta \text{Legislature}_{it} + \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \epsilon) \quad (1)$$

To measure NPC delegates' legislative emphasis, I employed the number of motions on each bill as my key explanatory variable, *Motion*. I calculated and regressed the responsive attitude on the number of motions initiated by the delegates from different occupations and NPC memberships respectively to specify the heterogeneous effect of motion initiators' personal characteristics. In the light of the occupational category, I classified delegates into seven occupational types: 1) government officials; 2) SOE managers 3) private entrepreneurs 4) military officials 5) public institute leaders 6) professions (lawyers, professors, doctors and journalists) and 7) others(including farmers, workers, servants who only account for 3% of the NPC delegates). Regarding the delegates' affiliation to various committees in NPC, I separated delegates' motions according to their NPC membership, including the dummy of STC members, SPC members and delegates with non-committee affiliation. Then I constructed 7+3=10 variables denoting the motions from seven occupations and three NPC positions and then regress the STC's responsive attitude on the number of motions from these sub-groups in NPC respectively.

The variable *legislature* is a vector of controls to alleviate heterogeneity problems among different acts. First, I used the number of articles and chapters to control for the components of law, which can be treated as logical "policy subunits that the delegates might address on in their motions. Second, I employed a dummy variable to control for the effect of the bill drafters. "1" denoted the NPC committees, including the STC and the SPC, NPC and legal work committee, while "0" denoted non-NPC institutions. To capture the effect of legislative

records on the legislative outcome, I controlled for the time since the latest amendment (“Last Amendment Time”) as well as the revising frequency (“Revising Frequency”). Moreover, I added the law category of the act according to the China’s official classification of the law. I coded the Constitutions and Relative Act as “1”; Civil and Business Act as “2”; Administration Act as “3”; Economics Act as “4”; Social Act as “5”; Criminal Act “6” and Procedural Act as “7”. In the regression model, I chose the “The Constitutions and Relative Act” including the Constitution of PRC, and several pivotal acts pertaining to the institutional setting of China’s political system as the base.

Additionally, I added the dummy of seven sub-committees in STC and year dummy in the baseline model. In the fixed effect model,  $\alpha_i$  captures the STC committee specific effects for *committee<sub>i</sub>*, whereas  $\gamma_i$  stands for the committee-invariant and time-specific effects for *year<sub>t</sub>*. Otherwise, the undetected error is captured by  $\epsilon$  in these two baseline models. In addition, I report the marginal effects(dFdx) in the following regression tables.

The baseline estimators of the determinants of the SPC’S responsive attitude are presented in Table 3. First. I employ the number of motion into the regression without the committee law category or year fixed effects in column 1. Then, from column 2 to column 6, I gradually add a vector of control variables and fixed effects in the case of being contaminated by multicollinearity and measurement error problems. To relieve the concern that the significant result is driven by the extreme cases, since over 97% the bill has less seven motions, while the rest got eight to as many as 42 motions, I construct a limited sample that only includes bills that assimilates less than seven in column 7.

[Table 3 about here.]

Model 1 only includes the key explanatory variable, the marginal effect of the motions is positive and statistically significant at 1% level. Model 2 adds the year and committee fixed effects, capturing the legislative tendency that probably driven by the extra-congress factors. The marginal effect of the motion turns to be 0.058 and consistently significant at 1% level. After adding the legislative records of the bill including the time of since latest revising time, revising frequency and the law category dummy the marginal effect of our key explanatory

variable increases to about 0.074 (column 6). The full model indicates that if a bill is addressed by one additional motion, the probability of this bill being respond as positive increases by 7.5%. Moreover, after excluding the extreme values, columns 7 shows that the number of motions is still positively correlated with the STC's responsive attitude.

The baseline model indicates that Chinese legislative bureaucracies respond more positively to the policy issues mentioned by a greater number of delegates' motions. After controlling for a set of variables that would affect the response attitudes, the effect of delegates' motions on the SPC's responsive attitude maintains positive and significant.

## 5 Robustness and Specifications

At the first glance, the baseline results seem compelling and confirm that SPC's legislative preference is influenced by the delegates' legislative emphasis. However, the omitted variables, measurement error and reverse causality problems might bias the baseline estimators towards zero. To relieve these concerns, in this section I conduct several robustness checks and specifications by 1) excluding more confounding factors pertaining to the political influence outside the congress to control 2) differentiating the effect of motions initiated by various different occupations and political positions 3) using Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of delegates' legislative emphasis as an alternative measure. 4) investigating the effect of delegates' motions on the legislative agenda, bill reading process and final legislative outcomes 5) employing a case study on how legislative bureaucracies incorporated delegate's demand when revising the criminal act. Together, these results valid the policy concession mechanism between the delegates and the bureaucracy-driven committees in NPC.

### 5.1 Drafters' Political Status and CPC's Inteference

A salient feature of authoritarian congress is that the parliament's policy decision is largely affected by the dictators' preference. In the case of China, since the Communist Party maintains the monopolized power in every aspect of the political arena, it is likely that both delegates' motions and STC's legislative response is pre-determined by the party's legislative preference. In

this paper, I use two indicators as the proxies for CPC's influence. The first one is a direct measure of CPC's legislative preference: the five-year legislative agenda released by the STC, which is directly controlled by the Communist leaders. Second, I employ a dummy of the policy focus of CPC's annual report. Besides the second plenum mainly focus on the personnel appointment and removal, other five annual plenums addresses four issues, administrative reform(2008); anti-corruption(2010); economic growth(2011); culture(2012). (The detailed coding rule is in Online Appendix)

As a variety of literature suggests, the legislation in China is shaped by the bargain between different administrative and legislative departments, especially the power struggle among the heads of these departments. Bills addressed by a powerful head, namely, the bill drafter are always approved quickly by the SPC and STC. To control for this drafter effect, in the baseline regression, I control for a department dummy of the drafter. To further eliminate the confounding variation from the drafters' political status, I employ their administrative and party ranks as the additional controls. I choose the Vice Department level and Non-Central Committee Member as the base group of the administrative ranks and party ranks respectively. The results of adding these controls are presented in Table 4.

[Table 4 about here.]

First, I regress the SPC's responsive attitude on the number of delegates' motions by controlling for the dummy of 11th NPC Five Year Legislative Plan, the CPC Annual Report, the interaction between bill drafters' administrative ranks and time dummy, and the interaction between of bill drafters' party ranks. By gradually adding these covariates one by one (Column1 to Column4), the key explanatory variable, the number of motions remains positive and significant at 5%. After adding the confounding factors of drafters' Political Status and CPC's influence (Column 5), despite the marginal effect of delegate's legislative emphasis measure declines from 0.0737 to 0.0582, it keeps significant at 5% level. The result suggests that even eliminating the variation of the extra-congress influence, the SPC's response attitude is still strongly determined by the number of delegates' motions, one additional motion on a draft increases the probability of this draft being responded to positively by the motion review released

by the SPC of NPC by 5.8%.

## 5.2 Whose Motion Matter?

In the light of the electoral rule of NPC that was elaborated in the background section, most of the STC and SPC members participated in the annual NPC session as other normal delegates with no committee affiliations. It is possible that the significant effect of the key independent variable mainly comes from the motions written by the political insiders the SPC and STC members who are in charge of *de facto* legislation. To relieve the concern, empirically, I differentiate the impact of STC, SPC and other non-committee members' motions on the STC's responsive attitude. If our conjunction is right that NPC is a platform for authoritarian leaders to ingratiate out-circle elites' demands, legislative bureaucracies will react more positively to the delegates without special affiliations. Owing to the data structure that the observation is on act level, I cannot directly add a variable of initiators' occupation and their NPC membership into the regression. As an alternative approach, I calculated the number of motions written by delegates from each occupation and NPC membership. For example, if there are six private entrepreneurs and five STC members initiate motions on a bill, then the variable the number of motions from private entrepreneurs is six and that of STC members is five.

[Table 5 about here.]

Table 5 displays the marginal effects of the motions from three types of membership. Holding all baseline controls and the additional controls of the drafters' political status and CPC's influence, I respectively regress SPC's responsive attitude on the motions initiated by normal NPC delegates, SPC member, STC member from column 1 to column 3. In column 4, I add three variables altogether into a single model. The full model shows that, after controlling for the effect of STC and SPC's legislative motions, the marginal effect of non-committee members' motions is 0.557 and significant at 5% level.

Additionally, it is likely that the *de facto* lawmaker' motions only play a decisive role in determining the responsive attitude on the condition that a bill receives a certain number of motions written by non-committee members. In other word, the interaction between delegates



with different memberships might have an additional impact on the motions review report. To test the validity of this claim, in column 5 and column 6, I interact the motions proposed by normal delegates with their counterparts addressed by the STC and the SPC members. However, the marginal effects of the interactions are close to zero, suggesting that the argument that the STC and SPC members play a more crucial role in the motion response system is invalid.

[Figure 4 about here.]

Besides analyzing the diverse impact of different NPC memberships, I inquire the effect of motions initiated by delegates from different occupations. I regress the responsive attitude on the number of motions drafted by delegates from seven different occupations and then calculate the marginal effects of each segment groups' short proposals. Figure 4 plots the marginal effects of the motions from diverse occupations 95% confidence interval. It shows that the SPC are more likely to release positive review report corresponding to the motions drafted by the professionals (doctors, lawyers and engineers and etc.) One additional professional's motion increases the probability of the receiving a positive review by 5.8%, which is similar with the baseline estimator, *ceteris paribus*.

### 5.3 Legislative Coalition of NPC Delegates

In this section, I emphasize on how bureaucratic-driven committees react to the collective action among different segment groups in NPC. I examine whether coalition has an impact on the legislation in NPC. In this paper, I use three indicators (party, delegation and occupation) of coalition to infer the effect of delegates' collective action on national legislation. In terms of the empirical test, this paper employs the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI") that are widely used in organizational economics and legislative studies as a pertinent measure of preference congruence. (Koford 1989; Squire 1992; Kroszner and Stratmann 1998). Equation 2 illustrates how to calculate the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index among eight satellite parties, thirty-five delegations, and nine parties. The HHI index ranges from 0 to 1 that a larger HHI index means a lower diversity of motion initiators.

$$HHI = \sum_{i=1}^N s_i^2 \quad (2)$$

shows that after controlling the effect of the motions' number on each bill, three HHI indicators are negatively correlated with the SPC's responsive attitudes, indicating that the diversity of motion initiators' personal background has a positive impact on the SPC's responsiveness attitude. When we are adding baseline controls and a set of fixed effects, the HHI of delegations is still positive and significant at 5% level while the HHI of occupations and party membership becomes insignificant. These findings suggest that legislative bureaucracies do concern delegation based coalition in NPC rather than party coalition prevailing in advanced democracies and the occupational coalitions.

[Table 6 about here.]

## 5.4 Legislative Outcome

Since the sample of my baseline model only covers the bills mentioned by delegates' motions, this setting may hamper us from infer the marginal effect of a bill mentioned by no motion to one motion on the legislative outcome. To deal with this sample selection problem, I construct a bill/act-year panel data set , including all 229 acts passed by NPC before the 11th session. In NPC, it is possible that the STC and the SPC suffered from the commitment problem, a prevailing phenomenon occurred in authoritarian regimes addressed by ([Gehlbach and Keefer 2011](#); [Svolik 2012](#)) that the autocrats fail to keep promise on the decisions made in the motion review. To address the question of whether the legislative bureaucracies do incorporate delegates' motions into the national legislation, I employ a dummy variable as the proxy for the current year's legislative outcome and next year's annual meeting plan. The following equation 3 and 4 show the details of estimation strategy.

$$P(\text{Legislation}_{it}) = \Phi(\beta \text{Motion}_{it} + \delta \text{Legislature}_{it} + \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \epsilon) \quad (3)$$

$$P(Agenda_{it+1}) = \Phi(\beta Motion_{it} + \delta Legislature_{it} + \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \epsilon) \quad (4)$$

Table 7 presents the regression results of how the number of motions affects legislative outcome in 11th NPC session. First, I use a discrete-time survival analysis to explore whether the motions exerts a positive impact on this year’s legislative outcome. Before controlling for a set of covariates, the margins of the motion is positive and significant at 1% level. After adding the controls, the marginal effect of the motion becomes insignificant. It suggests that the delegate’s legislative emphasis does not have a direct impact on the *de facto* legislative outcome.

[Table 7 about here.]

In addition to incorporating delegates’ demands directly into the policymaking, the STC could ingratiate delegates by incorporating their demands into the legislative agenda. Table 8 contains the regression results of the relationship between the number of motions and the dummy of next year’s annual legislative plan, reporting the marginal effect of delegates’ motions on both t and t+1 annual meeting plan. Whenever including a bunch of controls and fixed effects, all the coefficients of delegates’ motions are positive and statistically significant at less than 5% level. The full model (column 3) presents that if a bill is mentioned by one more legislative motion, the margins of this bill’s probability to be listed in next years’ annual meeting increases by 11.2%.

[Table 8 about here.]

A comparison between table 7 and table 8 shows that the marginal effects of motion on the legislative plan is almost two times larger than the marginal effect on the direct legislative outcome when controlling for all the pertinent variables. And the estimator of the motion in the legislative result model is not significant less than 10% level. Together, the result of the panel data analysis depicts that the delegates’ motion has a stronger impact on the formation of legislative agenda rather than the directly affect the legislation.

## 5.5 Bill reading process

In this section, I examine how delegates' motions affect bill reading process. In China's national assembly, the STC is in charge of the bill reading process. Regularly, the STC addresses three readings on a bill, while in some cases they might adjourn the reading because they could not make a consensus. During 2008-2012, the 11th NPC passed 58 bills, the reading time of which ranges from 6 months to 5 years and the reading session time of which varies from one to four.

The procedural rule of NPC regulates that STC members shall discuss the delegates' policy concerns. If delegates' motions exert impact on STC's decision, we shall observe a "filibuster" phenomenon in the bill reading process since the STC member shall spent more time on the issues that addressed by more motions. To test this filibuster hypothesis, I employ a survival analysis by using a Cox Hazard Model and a negative binomial regression on the number of reading conventions. If the conjecture of filibuster is right, delegates' legislative emphasis should has a negative correlation with the hazard of bill passing and are positively correlated with the number of bill reading convention.

Results of the Cox Hazard model and negative binomial regression are presented in Table 9. The negative coefficients of motions in Cox hazard regression (column 1 and 2) suggest that the number of motions is negatively correlated with the probability of a bill being passed by STC ,holding all else are equal. In other words, if a bill was mentioned by more delegates' motions, its length of reading period becomes longer. Besides using a continuous measure of a bill's "survival hazard", in column 3 and column 4 I show the results of the negative binomial regression, in that I use the number of bill reading meeting as the dependent variable. Consistent with the results of Cox hazard regressions, the number of motions is positively correlated with discrete measure of the bill reading time. Overall, these results implicate that despite NPC delegates could not talk out a bill, a strategy prevailing in the U.S. Congress, delegates in NPC can draft legislative motions to give pressure to the legislative bureaucracies, making bill reading more deliberately.

[Table 9 about here.]

## 5.6 Revising of Crime Act as a Detailed Case

In addition to using the bill reading process to prove the impact of motions on the legislative outcome, in this section I provide a content analysis to examine what happens to the individual delegates motions on revising the criminal act by tracing their influence through the legislative system.

The tracking method I used is as follows. First, I chose motions review reports released by the Committee for Internal and Judicial Affairs, to grabbed the statement of delegates motions. Second, I collected the sub-articles that occurred in the seventh and eighth amendment of criminal act, which were passed by 11th NPC. The third step was merging the content of delegates motion with the revised topics in the amendment of criminal act to inquire whether the policy issues addressed by the delegate has be incorporated in the final amendment.

In this paper, I only employ this content analysis on the revising of Chinese Criminal Act during 2008-2012 for two reasons. First, motion reviews on criminal act contain the most detailed information on delegates statements. In our sample of 1403 pieces of motion review report, motions on criminal act received reports containing over 632.1 Chinese character on average, while the mean of the rest motion reviews text length is 292.168. Second, the sample size is larger than any other policy issues. During the 11th NPC sessionThe criminal act is regarded as the most debatable issue; Over 162 motions focus on revising the existing criminal punishment institutions. Third, the policy statement of delegates motions is diverse and the topics including reducing the charges of the capital sentence, enhancing the informational safety, changing the term of penalty on organized crimes.

The content analysis(Figure 5) shows that over half of the delegates suggestions85 motions on revising six articles has been incorporated into the 7th or 8th Amendment to the Criminal Act that approved by STC in 2009 and 2011 in succession. Figure 5 displays the incorporating rate of each occupations motions. The criminal act amendment has absorbed 75% (39/52) of government officials motions from government officials. In addition, the STC take professionals and private entrepreneurs idea as a big deal that 15 of 38 professionals and 12 of 25 private entrepreneurs motions have been incorporated in the amendment.

[Figure 5 about here.]

## 6 Conclusion

By scrutinizing the relationship between delegates' motions and various types of legislative outcomes including the SPC's motion review, the STC's annual legislative plan, the bill reading process and the final legislative results, this paper articulates the micro logic of how Chinese legislative bureaucracies make decisions and how this authoritarian congress enables political participation of non-committee members in NPC, who are regarded as outsiders in China's political system. I argue that the institutional setup of China's national parliament provides a platform for policy concession between the authoritarian leaders and the elites. To my best knowledge, this paper is the first scholarship to explore the how policy concessions works in a single party state, a crucial issue ignored by the comparative political scientists for years.

Regarding the research methodology, my study contributes to a line of emerging literature that uses content analysis to analyze the black box of the authoritarian decision making. Inspired by [Malesky and Schuler \(2010\)](#), I employ a text analysis on the NPC delegates' motions and SPC's motion review report in Chinese national legislature, where the secret ballot system prevents scholars from obtaining vote records that provides delegates' preference.

I acknowledge that this research might still be confounded by the the endogeneity problems, especially, the reverse causality problem. For instance, it might be the case that, in order to build a "responsive" image, autocrats signal the NPC delegates to initiate motions on several specific policy issue and then pretend to incorporate their demands into policymaking. Regardless, my best effort has been expended to address the causal concern. I use both quantitative and qualitative evidence from 11th NPC session to show that legislative bureaucraciesthe agent of autocratsdo incorporate delegates' concerns into the national policymaking.

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# Appendices

Table A1: Party Membership of Chinese NPC

Party Name	Description	Freq.	Percent	Cum.
Chinese Communist Party	The founding and ruling political party of the People's Republic of China (PRC).	2,260	74.12	100
The Jiu San Society	Most of its 68,000 members are high- and medium level intellectuals in the fields of science, technology, education, culture and medicine.	60	1.97	1.97
The Revolutionary Committee Of Chinese Kuomintang	Formed by leftist members of the Kuomintang (KMT) who did not escape to Taiwan, it has 53,000 members.	42	1.38	3.35
China Democratic National Construction Association	Entrepreneurs from the manufacturing, financial or commercial industries, in both private and state sectors. Formed by 69,000 members.	60	1.97	5.31
China Association for Promoting Democracy	Intellectuals, mostly in the education, technology and publishing sectors. Some 65,000 members.	58	1.9	7.22
China Democratic League	Originally a league of pro-democracy parties. Formed by 130,000 members, mainly middle-level and senior intellectuals.	68	2.23	9.45
Chinese Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party	Most of its 65,000 members work in the fields of public health, culture and education, science and technology.	51	1.67	11.12
Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League	1,600 people, most of whom are prominent people that are from Taiwan or are of Taiwanese heritage, but now reside on the Mainland.	12	0.39	11.51
Zhigongdang of China	Returned overseas Chinese, relatives of overseas Chinese, and noted figures and scholars who have overseas ties, with 15,000 members.	36	1.18	25.88
Non Party Affiliation		402	13.18	24.7
Total		3,049	100	

TABLE A2: OCCUPATIONAL INDEX

OFFICIAL OCCUPATIONAL INDEX	MALESKY 2010 OCCUPATIONAL INDEX	N
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS	LOCAL OFFICIALS	1331
	VILLAGE OFFICIALS	70
	CENTRAL OFFICIALS	133
SOE MANAGERS	STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE	287
PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURS	PRIVATE ENTERPRISE/BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS	342
MILITARY OFFICIALS	MILITARY	291
PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS LEADERS	HIGH SCHOOL/COLLEGE	71
PROFESSIONALS	UNIVERSITY/RESEARCH	210
	ATHLETE	6
	CULTURAL INSTITUTE	43
	LAWYER	15
	PUBLIC HEALTH	78
	ENGINEER	41
	JOURNALIST	12
OTHERS	WORKERS	45
	MASS ORGANIZATIONS	43
	RELIGIOUS	14
	AGRICULTURAL WORKERS	17
TOTAL		3049

SOURCES: NPC OFFICIAL WEBSITE AND BAIDU ENCYCLOPEDIA

TABLE A3: CODING RULE OF THE SPC'S RESPONSIVE ATTITUDE

RESPONSE ATTITUDE	KEYWORDS	FREQ.	PERCENT	CUM.	
<b>Positive</b>	INCORPORATE INTO THE LEGISLATION	63	4.49	35.81	
	INCORPORATE INTO THE LEGISLATIVE PLAN	163	11.63	47.43	
<b>Negative</b>	UNDER DISCUSSION	291	20.76	23.04	
	TRANSFER TO THE GOVERNMENT	116	8.27	31.31	
	THE DEMAND IS IMMATURE, REJECT THE MOTION	273	19.47	79.89	
	INCORPORATE INTO THE LEGISLATIVE PLAN WHEN IT IS NECESSARY	182	12.98	60.41	
	DONE SOME RESEARCH, BUT NOT INCORPORATE CURRENTLY	286	20.25	99.43	
	ACT HAS ALREADY BEEN APPROVED, NOT INCORPORATE	32	2.28	2.28	
	TOTAL	1,402	100	100	

Figure 1: A COMPARISON BETWEEN APNPC AND STC




Figure 2: SEAT DISTRIBUTION OF 35 NPC DELEGATIONS




Figure 3: NPC LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE




Figure 4: MARGINAL EFFECTS OF DELEGATES FROM DIFFERENT OCCUPATIONS






Figure 5: THE NUMBER OF MOTIONS BEING INCORPORATED INTO THE 7TH AND 8TH CHINESE CRIMINAL ACT AMENDMENT




Table 1: THE PERSONAL INFORMATION OF 11TH NPC DELEGATES

VARIABLES	(1) N	(2) mean	(3) sd	(4) min	(5) max
Education	3049	17.38	2.808	6	22
Female	3049	0.21	0.408	0	1
Minority	3049	0.135	0.342	0	1
CCP member	3049	0.741	0.438	0	1
Age	3049	52.07	7.987	23	80
SPC member	3049	0.0925	0.29	0	1
STC member	3049	0.0633	0.244	0	1
Normal NPC delegate	3049	0.892	0.311	0	1
Legislative motions	3049	0.818	4.438	0	132

Sources: NPC Official Website and Baidu Encyclopedia

Table 2: Summary Statistics of the Baseline Model

VARIABLES	N	mean	sd	min	max
<b>Dependent Variable</b>					
Text length of SPC Review Report	1403	294.8	202.9	10	2084
Response Attitude	1403	0.161	0.368	0	1
<b>Key Explanatory Variable</b>					
Motion	1403	2.32	3.469	1	42
<i>Motion from</i>					
Normal NPC delegate	1403	2.266	3.46	0	42
STC Member	1403	0.0535	0.231	0	2
SPC Member	1403	0.0813	0.284	0	2
Government Officials	1403	1.056	2.069	0	26
SOE Managers	1403	0.191	0.443	0	3
Private Entrepreneurs	1403	0.379	0.767	0	7
Military Officials	1403	0.0335	0.188	0	2
Public Institutions Leaders	1403	0.097	0.339	0	5
Professionals	1403	0.531	0.998	0	9
Others	1403	0.0321	0.188	0	2
<b>Controls</b>					
Listed in 11th STC Plan	1403	0.112	0.315	0	1
Draft Department(1=NPC 0=Others)	556	0.327	0.47	0	1
Revising Frequency	553	0.676	1.001	0	5
Year Since the first revision	553	16.86	7.335	1	51
Year Since the latest revision	553	11.49	6.182	1	51

Table 3: THE BASELINE MODEL

VARIABLES	Dependent Variable: STC's Responsive Attitude Positive=1,Negative=0						
	Full Sample						Motion<7
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Probit dF/dX	Probit dF/dX	Probit dF/dX	Probit dF/dX	Probit dF/dX	Probit dF/dX	Probit dF/dX
Number of Motions	0.0492*** (0.0172)	0.0578*** (0.0150)	0.0692*** (0.0245)	0.0479*** (0.0117)	0.0582*** (0.0140)	0.0737*** (0.0253)	0.292** (0.123)
Number of Articles			0.000222 (0.00211)			0.00149 (0.00243)	-0.00110 (0.00265)
Number of Chapters			0.0211 (0.0282)			0.0258 (0.0320)	0.0549 (0.0366)
Draft Department(1=NPC 0=Others)				0.136 (0.190)		0.372* (0.225)	0.105 (0.242)
Year Since the latest revision					0.0265* (0.0144)	0.0319* (0.0176)	0.0475** (0.0185)
Revising Frequency					-0.0215 (0.109)	0.0271 (0.115)	0.108 (0.134)
Constant	-1.117*** (0.0582)	-2.578*** (0.374)	-2.580*** (0.650)	-2.650*** (0.472)	-3.136*** (0.487)	-3.300*** (0.770)	-3.648*** (0.957)
Observations	1,403	1,402	556	556	545	545	403
Year FE	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Committee FE	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Law Category FE	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Pseudo R-squared	0.0193	0.194	0.221	0.194	0.204	0.242	0.254
Log Likelihood	-607.4	-499.2	-213.2	-220.7	-208	-198	-135.2

SEs are clustered at the act level; \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table 4: CONTROLLING FOR DRAFTERS' POLITICAL STATUS AND CPC'S INFLUENCE

VARIABLES	Dependent Variable: STC Responsive Attitude Positive=1,Negative=0				
	(1) Probit dF/dX	(2) Probit dF/dX	(3) Probit dF/dX	(4) Probit dF/dX	(5) Probit dF/dX
Number of Motions	0.0739*** (0.0254)	0.0703*** (0.0272)	0.0691*** (0.0258)	0.0669*** (0.0245)	0.0582** (0.0268)
Observations	545	545	504	516	482
Baseline Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
CPC Annual Report	Y	N	N	N	Y
11th Legislative Plan*Year	N	Y	N	N	Y
Drafter's Administrative Ranks*Year Dummy	N	N	Y	N	Y
Drafters' Party Ranks*Year Dummy	N	N	N	Y	Y
Pseudo R-squared	0.242	0.273	0.239	0.265	0.303
Log Likelihood	-197.9	-190	-192.2	-187.5	-172.5

SEs are clustered at the act level; \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table 5: THE EFFECT OF MOTIONS INITIATED BY NORMAL DELEGATES, STC & SPC MEMBERS ON SPC'S RESPONSIVE ATTITUDE

VARIABLES	DependentVariable: SPC Response Positive=1,Negative=0					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Probit dF/dX	Probit dF/dX	Probit dF/dX	Probit dF/dX	Probit dF/dX	Probit dF/dX
Normal Delegate	0.0610** (0.0274)			0.0577* (0.0296)	0.0631** (0.0294)	0.0616* (0.0326)
STC Member		-1.711*** (0.558)		-1.879** (0.821)	-1.271* (0.658)	
SPC Member			0.00211 (0.315)	0.239 (0.447)		-0.209 (0.394)
STC Member*Normal Delegate					-0.0955 (0.0793)	
SPC Member*Normal Delegate						0.00541 (0.0241)
Constant	-3.812*** (0.925)	-3.635*** (0.923)	-3.563*** (0.924)	-3.811*** (0.934)	-3.853*** (0.927)	-3.860*** (0.937)
Observations	482	482	482	482	482	482
Drafters' Political Status	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
CPC Influence Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Baseline Controls&FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Pseudo R-squared	0.303	0.303	0.294	0.313	0.312	0.304
Log Likelihood	-172.3	-172.6	-174.8	-170	-170.1	-172.2

SEs are clustered at the act level; \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table 6: THE EFFECT OF PREFERENCE CONGRUENCE ON SPC'S RESPONSIVE ATTITUDE

VARIABLES	Dependent Variable: STC Response Positive=1,Negative=0			
	(1) Probit dF/dX	(2) Probit dF/dX	(3) Probit dF/dX	(4) Probit dF/dX
Herfindahl index of NPC delegates' party member	-0.727** (0.306)			
Herfindahl index of NPC delegates' occupation		-0.539* (0.293)		
Herfindahl index of NPC delegates' delegation			-0.975*** (0.312)	
Principal Components of Preference Congruence				-0.136** (0.0540)
Constant	-3.191*** (0.907)	-3.243*** (0.898)	-3.171*** (0.908)	-3.770*** (0.927)
Observations	482	482	482	482
Drafters' Political Status	Y	Y	Y	Y
CPC Influence Controls	Y	Y	Y	Y
Baseline Controls&FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
LogLikelihood	-171.3	-173	-169.4	-171.2

SEs are clustered at the act level; \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table 7: THE EFFECT OF DELEGATES' PROPOSALS ON THE LEGISLATIVE OUTCOME

VARIABLES	Dependent Variable: t time legislative result (Yes=1 No=0)		
	(1) Probit dF/dX	(2) Probit dF/dX	(3) Probit dF/dX
Number of Motions	0.0436** (0.0197)	0.0896** (0.0377)	0.0234 (0.0329)
Constant	-1.886*** (0.560)	-2.513*** (0.745)	-1.818*** (0.169)
Constant	-13.23 (351,211)	-12.94*** (0.300)	-13.41*** (0.654)
Observations	1,094	1,091	1,092
Number of Act	229	228	228
Controls	N	N	Y
Year FE	N	Y	Y
Law Category FE	N	Y	Y
Log Likelihood	-162.1	-150.5	-154.3

SEs are clustered at the act level; \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.



Table 8: THE EFFECT OF DELEGATES' MOTIONS ON THE ANNUAL LEGISLATIVE PLAN

VARIABLES	Dependent Variable:t+1 Annual Plan (Yes=1 No=0)		
	Probit dF/dX	Probit dF/dX	Probit dF/dX
Number of Motions	0.115*** (0.0346)	0.156*** (0.0538)	0.112** (0.0440)
Constant	-2.296*** (0.191)	-0.533 (0.364)	-2.891*** (0.399)
Constant	-0.411 (0.365)	-2.645*** (0.394)	-1.264** (0.516)
Observations	1,145	1,145	1,140
Number of Act	229	229	228
Controls	N	N	Y
Year FE	N	Y	Y
Law Category FE	N	Y	Y
Log Likelihood	-210.9	-204.4	-172

SEs are clustered at the act level; \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.

Table 9: THE EFFECT OF MOTIONS ON BILL READING PROCESS

VARIABLES	DV:Hazard Ratio of a bill being passed by STC/APNPC		DV: Reading time of a bill during the 11th NPC session	
	(1) Cox Model	(2) Cox Model	(3) NB Regression	(4) NB Regression
Number of Motions	-0.00312** (0.00122)	-0.0179** (0.00831)	0.00126*** (0.000299)	0.00664** (0.00270)
Listed in 11th STC Plan		-0.0160 (0.399)		0.175 (0.130)
Revising a law(1=Yes 0=No)		0.304 (0.307)		-0.181 (0.139)
Constant			0.784*** (0.0596)	-31.37 (0.324)
Constant			-31.46 (0)	0.898*** (0)
Observations	58	57	58	57
Year FE	Y	Y	N	Y
Law Category FE	Y	Y	N	Y
Pseudo R-squared	0.00565	0.0291	0.00490	0.0382
Log Likelihood	-178.4	-172.9	-87.92	-83.70

SEs are clustered at the act level; \* p<0.10, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p<0.01.